Google has lost its second major US antitrust trial, with US Distric🐭t Judge Leonie Brinkema finding the company violated the Sherman Act and is an illegal monopolist.

Google has already lost one antitrust case, with Judge Amit P. Mehta 168彩票:ruling in August 2024 that the company’s search business constituted an illegal monopoly. While the remedies portion of the trial are still ongoing, the DOJ is intent on forcing Google to divest itself of at least some critical parts of its business in an effort to reign the company in.

Now the company has lost its second case, with its advertising business deemed an illegal monopoly. the DOJ had successfully “proven that Google has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by willfully acquiring and maintaining monopoly power in the open-web display publisher ad server market and the open-web display ad exchange market, and has unlawfully tied its publisher ad server (DFP) and ad exchange (AdX) in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”

Acquisitions

Despite the overall finding that Google is an illegal monopolist, Judge Brinkema did not agree with the DOJ’s case that Google’s acquisitions of DoubleClick and Admeld were anticompetitive.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs ꦛhave failed to show that the DoubleClick and Admeld acquisitions were anticompetitive. Although these acquisitions helped Google gain monopoly power in two adjacent ad tech markets, they are insufficient, when viewed in isolation, to prove that Google acquired or maintained this monopoly power through exclusionary practices.

The Court acknowledged that the state of the online advertising market played a major role in this part of the determina🔥tion, with the online advertising industry being far more competitive at the time Google made its acqusitions.

Even assuming Plaintiffs are correct in their assessment of Google’s strategy, they have not shown that the acquisition of DoubleClick was anticompetitive. Plaintiffs do not assert that Goo𓄧gle had monopoly power in any of the relevant markets when it acquired DoubleClick. Indeed, the DoubleClick acquisition occurred at a time when Magnite (then known as Rubicon), Microsoft, OpenX, and Yahoo were vigorous participants in open-web display advertising markets. See PTX22 at 14. The acquisition was reviewed and cleared by the Federal Trade Commission by a four to one vote after a determination that “Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick is unlikely to substantially lessen competition.”

Nor did the 2011 acquisition of Admeld constitute anticompetitive conduct. Plaintiffs argue that the Admeld acquisition was problematic because Google intentionally acquired a “key competitor[],” ⭕PTX88 at -597, and then termဣinated its core yield management functionality, thereby ending a competitive threat to Google’s sell-side businesses. See Section V(B), supra. According to Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Abrantes-Metz, the Admeld acquisition reduced competition in both the ad exchange and publisher ad server markets for open-web display advertising.

Tying DFP to AdX

Where Google crossed the line into anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior🥃 was with its tying DFP and AdX.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Google tied DFP, its publisher ad server, to AdX, its ad exchange. Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to Google’s technical and policy restrictions that prohibited publishers from receiving real-time bids from AdX (the tying product) unless they also used DFP (the tied product). These restrictions, according to Plaintiffs, compelled publishers to use DFP, not because they viewed it as a superior product, but rather due to Google’s exploitation of its control over AdX’s preeminent position in the open-web display ad exchange market. Partly as a result, Plaintiffs claim that DFP became, and has remained, the dominant publisher✨ ad server for open-web display advertising.

Plaintiffs have proven the 𝄹four elements of their tying claim.

As discussed previously,ꦆ overwhelming evidence has established that it is not economically feasible for publishers to use multiple publisher ad servers. See Section VI(B)(1), supra. For all practical purposes, then, Google’s tying DFP to AdX communicated to publishers that if they used a rival publisher ad server, they would be shut out of AdX’s core functionality. This coercive pressure was akin to a “threat[] to stop selling needed products to its customers if they bought from a new market entrant offering a superior product for less money”—conduct a court found to be anticompetitive in Chase Mfg. 84 F.4th at 1173.

By forcing Google’s publisher customers to use a product they would not necessarily have otherwise used, by making it difficult for rival publisher ad servers to compete on the merits, and by significantly reducing rivals’ market share, the tying of DFP to AdX has had a substantial anticompetitive effect in the pu💫blisher ad server market for open-web display advertising. Accordingly, the AdX-DFP tie has violated both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Google Chastised for Its Behavior

Judge Brinkema also called out Google for its behavior, including failure to preserve internal communications and abusing attorney-client privilege. The Court’s finding is similar to Judge Mehta’s in the search antitrust case. Just as in that case, Judge Brinkema declined to sanction Google, as the overall finding against the company made additional sanctions unnecessary.

Google’s systemic disregard of the evidentiary rules regarding spoliation of evidence and its misuse of the attorney-client privilege may well be sanctionable. But because the Court has found Google liable under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act based on trial testimony and admitted evidence, including those Google documents that were preserved, it need not adopt an adverse inferencไe or otherwise sanction Google for spoilation at this juncture. As in Google Search, the Court’s decision not to sanction “should not be understo🥂od as condoning Google’s failure to preserve chat evidence

Conclusion

Judge Brinkema wraps u🔯p with her🌜 final conclusion regarding Google.

Plaintiffs have proven that Google has willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server🦂 and ad exchange markets for open-web display advertising. For over a decade, Google has tied its publisher ad server and ad exchange together through contractual policies and technological integration, which enabled the company to establish and protect its monopoly power in these two markets. Google further entrenched its monopoly power by imposing anticompetitive policies on its customers and eliminating desirable product features. In addition to depriving rivals of the ability to compete, this🐷 exclusionary conduct substantially harmed Google’s publisher customers, the competitive process, and, ultimately, consumers of information on the open web. Accordingly, Google is liable under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

Much like the seღarch engine cas💛e, the DOJ and Google will now move forward with arguing the remedies portion of the case.

It’s hard to understate the potential impact of Google’s second antitrust defeat in less than a year’s time. The company has now suffered been labeled an illegal monopolist in two of its core businesses. The DOJ is already trying to force Google to divest itself of Chrome in its search antitrust, and is holding out the option to force it to sell of Android if Chrome alone is not enough of a remedy. It’s unlikely the DOJ will push for any remedies that are less dramatic in its latest victory.

Combined with 168彩票:the likely loss of Chrome—not to mention the threat of losing Android—any remedies that could involve breaking up Google’s advertising business could result in significant setbacks for the company.